Export Screening

The final step in the export process following classification and license determination is screening. All shipments (including temporary shipments, repairs, and shipments of test equipment or software) or transfers of technology to foreign persons must be screened before they are shipped/released. The screens that must be performed—at both the contract-formation stage and/or immediately before exportare described below. In addition to list-driven requirements based on the U.S.Munitions List (USML) or Commerce Control List (CCL), a range of other factors, including the country of destination, the identity of the end-user, and the proposed end-use, must be examined to determine whether a license is required. KU utilizes Amber Road, an online database, to conduct many of these checks. The Office of Export Compliance (OEC) will provide access and training on using Amber Road for personnel needing to conduct screening. The Amber Road login page is available here.  Contact gos@ku.edu if new user access is required, or complete the webform to have a screening conducted on your behalf.

A.    Screening Based on Export Classification

PIs or assigned department personnel must check the classification of the product, software, or technology to be shipped to determine if it requires a license. If the item has not yet been previously classified and reviewed by OEC, the ECO must be contacted.  If the product or technology falls under a classification requiring a license, the ECO will determine whether a license exemption or exception is available. If not, the ECO will apply for the required license.  Export of a licensable product, software or technology may not take place until the license has been granted.  Controlled technical data may not be released until a license is obtained.  In particular, foreign nationals may not have access to controlled Technical Data until a license and Technology Control Plan is in place.

B.    Screening for Embargoed Countries

If screening results using Amber Road identifies embargoes, sanctions, other alerts, the ECO must be contacted in order to conduct an export analysis and seek the appropriate US government authorization.

C.    Screening for Prohibited Individuals or Entities

To ensure that KU does not engage with unauthorized parties, personnel must conduct export screening to include prospective and existing customers for software, technology, and servicing, against the Denied Persons List (“DPL”), the Entity List, Unverified Parties List, the List of Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List), and the State Department’s list of debarred parties, before KU enters into a contract; relationship or effects a transaction with that party. (These lists are collectively referred to in this Manual as the “Restricted Parties Lists.” In addition, freight forwarders, vendors, banks and issuers of letters of credit, foreign visitors, and consultants must be screened against the Restricted Parties Lists. If a party’s name is found on one of the Restricted Parties Lists at any point, the ECO must be notified immediately.  Any order or further action with respect to that party must be suspended pending the outcome of consultations with the ECO and legal counsel, if required.

D.    Screening for Diversion Risks

The export or re-export of U.S.-origin products to unauthorized destinations, end-users, or end-uses may trigger licensing requirements (even for EAR 99 items). Therefore, all transactions are subject to diversion risk screening.  To assist in determining when a transaction may not be authorized or may lead to an illegal diversion, the Department of Commerce has published a list of red flags (Export Administration Regulations, Supplement 3 to Part 732), listed below. The screener must check potential customers/transactions against the red flags described below. While this list is not all-inclusive, these indicators should be used as a guide for identifying suspicious or unusual transactions that warrant further scrutiny before going forward. The following are red flags:

• The recipient or end user is reluctant to offer information about the end-use of material being transferred.

• The item or material being transferred does not fit the recipient’s end use. For example, shipment of a toxic reagent being sent to a liberal arts department.

The material being transferred is incompatible with the technical level of the recipient to which the material is being shipped. For example, semiconductor material, prototypes would be of little use if the recipient is researching an infectious disease.

• The recipient is unknown to KU researchers.

• The recipient does not want to document the material or information transfer.

• The recipient is a middle person for the end user of the material or information to be transferred.

• Installation, training, or maintenance services are declined by the end user.

• Delivery addresses are not associated with the end user, or deliveries are planned for out-of-the- way destinations.

• A freight-forwarding firm or post office box is listed as the product’s final destination.

• A requested shipping route is abnormal for the material and destination.

• Packaging requirements are inconsistent with the stated method of shipment or destination. KU personnel will review the terms and conditions and all other pertinent information when
planning an export and take note of these or any other abnormal circumstances that indicate the export is intended for an inappropriate end-use, end-user, or destination. If the planned export raises any red flags, the ECO must be notified immediately.

E.    Screening for Proliferation Activities

U.S. law prohibits the export and re-export of items or technology if they are destined for certain activities or projects in countries of concern. Activities of proliferation concern include activities involving nuclear production or technology, missile technology, and chemical and biological weapons. (Each area is described below.)

If there is doubt as to whether or not proliferation concerns exist, the OEC or a Export Control Team member (ECT) should be contacted. If any KU employee has any reason to suspect that a recipient is involved in a prohibited end-use, the employee must notify the ECO immediately.  No export or re-exports to the recipient should occur unless and until the ECO obtains a license or determines that a license is not required.

F.    Screening for Anti-boycott Language

The anti-boycott rules were implemented to prevent U.S. business from participating directly or indirectly in the Arab League’s boycott of Israel.  The laws prevent U.S. persons from doing business under terms that would restrict that person’s ability to do business with other countries under a boycott not recognized by the U.S.  The Arab League’s boycott has lessened over the years, but still remains in effect in some countries.  These restrictions are enforced by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).  The applicable regulations are at 15 C.F.R. § 760.

Anti-boycott restrictions are most likely to appear in dealings with entities in certain Arab League countries.  As of this writing, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab

G. Using Amber Road for Restricted Party Screenings

1.    Screen full name (first, middle, last) of person and/or entire name of organization or entity.

2.    In the comment section, you may want to use the drop down menu and/or write a brief note about the reason for screening, i.e. the project title, or something to identify the person/entity for future reference.  Amber Road (AR) re-screens periodically, and it will help you identify the reason for the screening or the associated project.

3.    If you receive an “Alert” on the person or entity, do an “Exact” search using the full name.  If you still receive a hit from AR, compare the physical addresses (i.e., if you know the person is from the UK, and you have a hit which says the person is from California, it is probably not the same person).  If no location is listed or the locations are the same, look at the birthday of the person screened and compare.

4.    If you receive a re-screening “Alert” notice from AR, look at the comment section as a reminder as to why the person/entity was initially screened.  Also compare the name you initially screened against the names of the “hits” that VC lists below the screen.  Because AR screens at a high “fuzzy” level, it is not uncommon for several names to be listed. Typically most of the names listed will only include a portion of the name that was originally screened; i.e., not a “Alert”.

5.    Notify the University Export Control Officer of a true “Alert” or if assistance is needed in making a determination (gos@ku.edu).

6.    The Office of Export Compliance will verify any positive hits against the appropriate agency lists.   

7.    No payments should be given to or contracts signed with any person or entity positively identified on one of the lists until it has been cleared through the UECO (a license may be required or in fact, could be denied).
8.    If the hit is verified and KU has already conducted transactions (i.e. signed an agreement) with that person or entity, the UECO and Office of the General Counsel should be notified immediately.

9.    A determination will be made as to the next course of action which could include filing a violation disclosure to the agency that maintains the list and removing the individual from a project (if applicable).

10.  If you have any questions or need additional assistance, contact OEC at gos@ku.edu.  

Amber Road Ad Hoc Screening Process Quick Reference Guide

Amber Road Quick Create Screening Process Quick Reference Guide